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Abstract 
Although the inland region of China has generally been left behind in economic 
development compared with the coastal region, the motorcycle industry in Chongqing 
has recorded remarkable growth due to the meteoric rise of private enterprises over the 
last decade.  Based on panel data of enterprises, we attempt to identify the factors 
behind the dynamic development of this industry.  We conclude that the success of the 
motorcycle industry in Chongqing is attributable to a combination of positive features 
from the Wenzhou model in the 1990s, in which industrial development is based on 
clustering of private enterprises, and the Sunan model in the 1980s, in which industrial 
development is based on the effective use of human resources recruited from existing 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Learning by collective enterprises from SOEs in 
Chongqing coupled with the growth of the private enterprise sector fostered 
cluster-based industrial development.   
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1. Introduction 
For the last three decades, the center of the considerable economic growth in 
China has been the coastal region.  In the 1980s, industrial development in this region 
was led by collective township and village enterprises (TVEs), as Chen et al. (1992), 
Jefferson et al. (1996), and Otsuka et al. (1998) attest.  According to Murakami, Liu, 
and Otsuka (1994, 1996) and Xu and Tan (2001), collective TVEs south of the Yangtze 
River in Jiangsu Province grew rapidly partly because they learned technical and 
managerial expertise from state-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially those in 
Shanghai.1 When privatization began in China in the early 1990s, nationwide attention 
was attracted to a strategy of private-enterprise-led development in Wenzhou City and 
its vicinity in Zhejiang Province.  According to Zhang (1989), Nolan and Dong (1990), 
Wang (1996), Zhang (1999), and Sonobe, Hu, and Otsuka (2004), the hallmark of 
industrial development in Wenzhou was the industrial cluster, i.e., the geographical 
concentration or localization of enterprises producing similar or closely related goods in 
a small area.2 Such clusters were formed in almost every township in the Wenzhou area 
by a myriad of fake-collectives or small-scale red-cap private enterprises.3  
In the inland economy, the SOEs remained predominant in the industrial sector, 
which was biased toward the munitions industry and related heavy industries built up 
for the purpose of the Third Front Construction in the 1960s and 1970s.4  However, 
entry of private enterprises is vitalizing the local industries in several inland cities, 
especially in Chongqing and its vicinity.5  Thus, the recent GDP growth in Chongqing, 
which has been faster than the growth of the national economy, cannot be attributed 
solely to increased central funding associated with the promotion of Chongqing to a 
Municipality directly under the central government in March 1997 and the campaign to 
Open Up the West.  Such new developments should mitigate regional income 
inequality between the coastal and inland regions, which is pronounced and even 
widening according to Kanbur and Zhang (1999), Hare and West (1999), and Fu (2004).  
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However, to date, the process of industrial development in the inland region has not 
been analyzed rigorously.6   
This paper attempts to characterize the process of industrial development in the 
inland economy from a comparative perspective using primary data collected from 
motorcycle enterprises in Chongqing.  The motorcycle industry in China dates back to 
the 1950s; China is now the largest producer in the world, accounting for nearly half of 
total world production.  In Chongqing, this industry began around 1980 when two 
SOEs diverted production from ammunitions to motorcycles and were allowed to import 
technology and equipment from Japan.  These SOEs leapfrogged the incumbents in 
other cities and became the leading producers in the country.  In the 1980s, collective 
TVEs were established to produce motorcycle parts, but they did not play an important 
role in the development of the motorcycle industry in Chongqing.  By contrast, 
extensive entry of private enterprises, which began in the early 1990s, changed the 
industrial organization dramatically.  New entrants formed motorcycle clusters in 
several cities including Chongqing.  The flood of their low-quality products caused a 
drastic decline in the market prices of motorcycles.  Since the price decline hit the 
SOEs particularly hard, Chongqing lost its primary position in the industry in the 
mid-1990s.  However, the municipality recovered in only a few years because three of 
the small private enterprises grew considerably and formed large enterprise groups. This 
recovery occurred even though production by SOEs continued to decline and many 
private enterprises exited the industry.  Currently, Chongqing accounts for almost 40% 
of total motorcycle production in China.7 
Although many industrial clusters have been formed in developing countries, few 
have achieved the phenomenal growth attained by the motorcycle cluster in 
Chongqing.8 The exit of many enterprises alongside of the spectacular growth of other 
enterprises in this cluster is reminiscent of a common pattern of industrial development 
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that has been observed in developed countries in the past and in the coastal region of 
China recently.9  The key to this successful transformation from the dominance of 
SOEs to the vigorous growth of private enterprises in the generally backward economy 
in the inland region is addressed in this paper using primary data. 
Our main finding is that this success owes much to the massive recruitment of 
engineers by private firms from SOEs, both those in the motorcycle industry and other 
local enterprise.  Learning relatively advanced technologies and management 
know-how from SOEs is also a characteristic of the Sunan model, which refers to the 
development strategy pursued in southern Jiangsu in the 1980s; however, the growing 
enterprises in this model were collective TVEs and they were not part of a cluster.  
Although private enterprises in Wenzhou were clustered, they had less opportunity to 
learn from SOEs than did their counterparts in Chongqing.  Thus, the development 
process of the motorcycle industry in Chongqing combines positive features of the 
Sunan and Wenzhou models as it is based on learning from SOEs by cluster-based 
private enterprises.  We argue that this combination is the key to the successful 
industrial development of the inland region. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 contains a review of the 
empirical literature on industrial development, paying particular attention to case studies 
from various parts of the world to provide a comparative perspective.  In section 3, we 
describe our data-collection method and report basic statistics on production, R&D, and 
growth of the sample enterprises.  In section 4, we present the testable hypotheses and 
the resulting econometric specifications. Section 5 contains the empirical results.  
Finally, section 6 offers a summary of the findings of the paper and a discussion of their 
policy implications. 
 
2. A Comparative Perspective on Industrial Development 
 6 
As Krugman (1991) emphasizes, the industrial cluster is historically and spatially 
ubiquitous.  Schmitz and Nadvi (1999) compile case studies conducted in South Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America and show that agglomeration externalities arising from 
industrial clusters, e.g., information spillovers, the development of the division and 
specialization of labor among enterprises, and the development of skilled labor markets, 
play critical roles in industrial development.  Although the industrial cluster was 
relatively uncommon in China under the planned economy regime,10 an increasing 
number of clusters have been formed since the early 1990s after the privatization of 
enterprises afforded freer locational choice. 
The expansion of a cluster reinforces the benefits of agglomeration economies so 
that new entry is easier even for novices with little technical and managerial expertise.  
Since such new entrants tend to be inefficient producers, the productivity growth of the 
industry is often negligible or even negative in the early stage of industrial development, 
as Sonobe, Kawakami, and Otsuka (2003) find in their study of the machine tool 
industry in Taiwan.  The motorcycle industry in postwar Japan made no progress in the 
average quality of engines until the mid-1950s during which the number of producers 
increased dramatically from 5 to more than 120, according to Yamamura, Sonobe, and 
Otsuka (2004).  Similarly, the motorcycle industry in China expanded in terms of the 
number of enterprises and total production in the early 1990s without developing 
attractive products, according to Ohara (2001) and Shi and Wang (2002).   
Such quantitative expansion without qualitative change saturates the local market 
with low-quality standard products.  In developing countries, the resultant decline in 
product prices and profitability often halted the growth of the industry, as in the cases of 
a shoe cluster in the Philippines (Lamberte and Jose, 1988), a tile cluster in Indonesia 
(Weijland, 1999), and a garment cluster in Peru (Visser, 1999).  In many industries in 
both developed and developing countries, such crises were overcome by the 
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improvements in product quality by innovative enterprises.11  In the motorcycle 
industry in interwar Germany and Britain and postwar Japan, drastic declines in product 
prices triggered not only quality competition but also innovations in marketing, 
financial, and organization that accelerated the growth of the industry, as Braun and 
Panzer (2003) and Yamamura, Sonobe, and Otsuka (2004) discuss. 
Based on historical data on the development of industries in the U.S. and U.K., 
Gort and Klepper (1982) establish the propensity for the number of enterprises to 
increase rapidly in the early stage of an industry’s development, to reach a peak, and 
then to decline in the later stage.12  The motorcycle industry in Germany, Britain, and 
Japan followed this evolutionary process leading to an oligopolistic market structure.  
Interestingly, quality competition tends to be accompanied by exits and mergers of 
enterprises.  Such shakeouts take place presumably because qualitative upgrading leads 
to some type of scale advantage.  As Romer (1990a, 1990b) argues, the results of R&D, 
e.g., improved product design and better production processes, are non-rival inputs in 
the sense that they can be used repeatedly without additional cost.  If qualitative 
upgrading requires the large mechanization of production processes, the result will be an 
increase in the minimum efficient size of the plant.  This shift to large-scale production 
by upgrading enterprises will force other enterprises out of the market. 
Qualitative upgrading and shakeouts following quantitative expansion are 
observed in industries in the coastal region of China.  According to Sonobe, Hu, and 
Otsuka (2004), some producers of electric switches and ampere meters in Wenzhou 
found that the demand for their improved products increased dramatically with the 
increase in consumer recognition of their brand names so that the expanded scale of 
their marketing activities increased sales more than proportionately.  Importantly, 
brand names or the results of R&D can be shared within the same enterprise group, i.e., 
a parent enterprise and its subsidiaries.  Thus, the formation of enterprise groups 
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allows firms to take full advantage of these non-rival inputs.  Since the mid-1990s, 
group formation has been pervasive in the coastal region of China.13   
The existing case studies suggest that the development process of the motorcycle 
industry in Chonging after the emergence of private enterprises is not unique but rather 
similar to the evolutionary processes observed in developed countries and in the coastal 
region of China.  However, the slow growth of the inland economy in general makes 
the reasons for this successful transition from quantitative expansion to qualitative 
upgrading interesting to investigate.  According to the recent literature on industrial 
clusters and global value chains, the upgrading of local industries in developing 
countries is facilitated by their transactions with global buyers, e.g., large manufacturers 
and retailers with well-known brand names.14  Such favorable opportunities were not 
available to the private motorcycle enterprises in Chongqing according to Hu (2003).  
We hypothesize that enterprises in this municipality took advantage of the large pool of 
engineers employed and trained by SOEs in the motorcycle industries as well as in other 
machinery and munitions industries in the inland region.  In fact, we will show that 
successful enterprises recruited many engineers from SOEs.  However, this fact does 
not necessarily imply that the recruitment of engineers is the main cause of superior 
enterprise performance.  Rather, the causality may work in the opposite direction. 
Moreover, the issue of stagnant production of motorcycles by SOEs during the period 
requires exploration.  To address these issues, we begin with an in-depth analysis of the 
data in the next section. 
  
3.  The Data 
The China Automotive Industry Yearbook (Automobile Department of 
Mechanical Industry, various years) provides statistical data on production, revenues, 
and other information for enterprises that are producing finished motorcycles and are 
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operating by permission of the government.  Figure 1 depicts the number of such 
motorcycle makers in China and the total value of their production from 1980 to 2003.  
Production grew rapidly in the early 1990s and, by 1995, it exceeded the production 
peak in 1981 in Japan, which had been the largest producer in the world. The export of 
motorcycles, mainly to Asia and Africa, began when the growth of domestic 
consumption stagnanted in the late 1990s. Exports have increased rapidly since 2000 
reaching three million in 2003, which accounts for 20.6% of the total number of 
motorcycles produced.  However, these data do not cover small producers operating 
without government permission. Such enterprises proliferated in the 1990s, mainly in 
rural areas, due to the large demand for cheap motorcycles from rural consumers, as 
Ohara (2005) documents.   
We conducted preliminary surveys of motorcycle enterprises in Chongqing, 
which is the largest production base for the industry in China, in August and December 
of 2001. Subsequently, a census of all the enterprises producing motorcycles or 
motorcycle engines was attempted from November to December 2002.  We visited 
enterprises, including their subsidiary enterprises but not subsidiaries of subsidiaries, to 
interview managers using questionnaires and to obtain financial records.  As a result, 
we collected data from 44 enterprises, i.e., about 80 percent of all such enterprises in the 
area, concerning the backgrounds of top managers and information about the enterprises, 
e.g., production, costs, marketing channels, and employment. We have data for 1995 
and every year from 1997 to 2001 .15   
Table 1 reports the number of sample enterprises by year, ownership type, and 
specialization.  Three SOEs in our sample were munitions factories previously.  Two 
of these three, namely, Jialing and Jianshe, began producing motorcycles around 1980 
using technology and equipment imported from Japanese makers, i.e., Honda and 
Yamaha, and soon became the largest producers of motorcycles in China.16  Jianshe 
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and Yamaha formed a joint venture (JV), namely, Jianshe-Yamaha, in 1992, which is 
included in our sample separately from Jianshe.  Although our sample does not include 
a JV founded by Jialing and Honda in 1993, it includes Wangjiang-Suzuki, which was 
founded by a military SOE and a Japanese maker, namely, Suzuki, in 1993.  
All the other observations in the sample are private enterprises.17  According to 
the managers of some long-established enterprises, numerous small-scale private 
enterprises entered the motorcycle industry in Chongqing as assemblers, engine makers, 
or parts suppliers, in the early 1990s. These new entrants formed an industrial cluster 
with an active division of labor among enterprises; however, many enterprises had 
exited by the time we conducted our survey.  Of the private enterprises that began 
producing either finished motorcycles or engines by 1995, 10 enterprises survived and 
are included in our sample.  Although the SOEs absorbed Japanese technology through 
formal agreements of technical cooperation and guidance as well as by the 
establishment of JVs, the private enterprises copied the original models of the Japanese 
makers without any formal relationships involving capital investment and technical 
cooperation. 
Of the 20 enterprises that are private and operating in 1997, four are subsidiaries 
and 16 are independent enterprises, including three parent enterprises of the subsidiaries, 
namely, Lifan, Zongshen, and Loncin.  The three enterprise groups led by these parent 
enterprises achieved remarkable growth during this period so that we refer to them as 
the Big 3. Nonetheless, Jialing and Jianshe remained among the largest producers in 
China throughout this period.18  In 1999, another independent enterprise became a 
parent with an assembly subsidiary and an engine subsidiary, but this group remained 
much smaller than the Big 3.  The number of independent enterprises in the sample 
increased by three per year until 1999, reached a peak in 2000, and then decreased by 
two because t two formerly independent enterprises became subsidiaries of two of the 
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Big 3.  Taking the incidence of exits into account, we conclude that the consolidation 
of the industry began in Chongqing around the end of the 1990s.   
Interestingly, specialization in motorcycle assembly and engine production occurs 
mostly within the four enterprise groups.  This division of labor among enterprises 
would be more efficient than a vertically integrated production system if production size 
is large enough and if the parts and components used by the assembler are simple and 
standard.  However, as the Big 3 improve the quality of their motorcycles and increase 
the use of specially designed high-quality parts and components, the cost of transacting 
for these intermediate input increases for them.19  However, division and specialization 
within enterprise groups reduces such transaction costs.   
Table 2 reports the declining real prices of motorcycles and engines.  The data 
for this table are obtained by dividing the real value of the production of motorcycles or 
engines by the number of motorcycles or engines produced, and then by averaging such 
prices over the sample enterprises.  The deflator used is the machinery price index 
aggregated at the national level from China State Statistical Bureau (various years).  
Admittedly, such price data reflect not only the product quality but also the size and 
type of products, an issue we consider below.  Throughout the period, JVs commanded 
the highest price because they enjoyed a reputation for producing high-quality 
motorcycles that were comparable to those imported from Japan.  The products of the 
SOEs were much more expensive than those of the private enterprises in 1995, partly 
because their product lines were oriented toward larger products and partly because they 
were less efficient than private enterprises.  
Jefferson, Rawski, and Zheng (1996) and Hsiao et al. (1998) point to the 
inefficiency of SOEs relative to collective TVEs and private enterprises in the industrial 
sector of the Chinese economy.  Based on their case studies of the iron and steel, 
garment, and machine-tool industries in China, Otsuka, Liu, and Murakami (1998) 
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ascribe the inefficiency of SOEs partly to their vertically integrated production system, 
in which many parts and intermediate inputs are manufactured within an enterprise.  In 
our sample, SOEs procured only 51 percent of the engine parts from outside sources in 
1995 and 67 percent of these inputs from outside sources in 2001. In contrast, private 
enterprises procured 97 percent and 93 percent from outside sources in these same two 
years.20  Thus, private enterprises depend heavily on outsourcing to produce copies of 
Japanese motorcycles at low cost, even though the Big 3 tend to procure important parts 
from within their own groups.     
Table 3 provides further information about motorcycle prices.  In our survey, we 
asked the manager of each sample enterprise about prices, horsepower, and engine sizes 
in terms of the displacement of its two best-selling motorcycles as of 2001.  The unit 
price shown in Table 3 corresponds to the price divided by displacement.  Since the 
price of a motorcycle tends to increase with its displacement, this unit price is a better 
price index than the average price shown in Table 2.  Table 3 also reports the engine 
quality index, which was computed following the formula in Taylor (1960).21  The 
sample size of the data on engine quality is small because many respondents did not 
answer our question about horsepower.  This table does not distinguish parent 
enterprises from subsidiaries because a parent and its subsidiaries share the same brand 
name, the same unit prices, and the same levels of engine quality.  Table 3 indicates, 
that, despite the small sample size, the difference in engine quality between the SOEs 
and the Big 3 is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. However, their unit prices 
are almost identical indicating that SOEs could not be producing high-quality 
motorcycles efficiently.  Between the Big 3 and the other private independent 
enterprises, the difference in engine quality is statistically insignificant. However, the 
difference in unit price is highly significant, which suggests that the Big 3 enjoy an 
advantage due to their established brand names.22   
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Table 4 presents the average numbers of motorcycles and engines produced along 
with the average value added by enterprise type.  For the Big 3 and another enterprise 
group, these variables measure the production size of the whole group not only the 
parent enterprise.  The drastic decline in production by SOEs and the extraordinarily 
fast growth of the Big 3 are evident in this table.  The value added of SOEs decreases 
considerably not only because prices decline most drastically for them but also because 
their production volumes decrease.  By contrast, the number of motorcycles produced 
by the Big 3 increases more than five fold and the production of engines increases 
almost four fold from 1998 to 2001 so that value added almost triples for the Big 3 
despite the severe decline in product prices.  Moreover, their subsidiaries are much 
larger than other independent enterprises.23  The JVs experience somewhat more 
moderate growth in output that that of the Big 3 and they maintain their value added 
relatively constant during this period.  Although the products of JVs enjoy a good 
reputation and command high prices, these enterprises could not grow as rapidly as the 
Big 3 because of intense competition with private enterprises producing low-price 
copies of their products.  Indeed, many private enterprises in Chongqing increased 
their sales of low-quality products rapidly in rural areas, where the demand for such 
motorcycles increased.24 
The fact that the Big 3 continue to grow faster than all other enterprises even after 
1998, when their production sizes had already become much larger, suggests that they 
were benefiting from scale advantages.  When the Big 3 were founded in the early 
1990s, they were also small.  Moreover, the educational and occupational backgrounds 
of their founders are not systematically different from those of other independent 
enterprises.  Thus, the success of the Big 3 is attributable largely to unobservable 
entrepreneurial characteristics of their founders. The core of their successful strategies 
involves improving the quality of their products, establishing a good reputation among 
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consumers, and shifting to mass production of relatively high-quality products at low 
cost.     
To improve products and introduce mass production, engineers are required.  
The top portion of Table 5 shows that, as early as 1995, the Big 3 employed more 
engineers than the other independent enterprises. Moreover, they increased the 
employment of engineers at faster rates than other enterprises in the subsequent years.  
In the early years, most of these engineers came from SOEs.  Some were from the 
SOEs producing motorcycle but many came from SOEs in other heavy industries, 
which were abundant in Chongqing.  In the later years, the proportion of new 
graduates from technical schools and universities increased.  As the middle portion of 
the table indicates, the Big 3 also increased R&D expenditure per engineer rapidly.   
The bottom portion of the table reports the percentage of enterprises that recruited 
their general managers from SOEs.  The percentage of private enterprises having such 
managers increased faster in the later years than in the earlier years, probably because 
increased size prompted the Big 3 to upgrade management and because the other 
independent enterprises were seeking survival strategies.  Thus, the development in 
Jiangsu province, in which collective TVEs learn technologies and management 
know-how from SOEs, was adopted by private enterprises in Chongqing. Although 
Table 5 indicates that SOEs allocated considerable amounts of human and material 
resources to R&D, the engine quality of their motorcycles was significantly lower than 
that of the Big 3, as reported in Table 2.  As a possible explanation, we suggest that the 
work of engineers is more difficult to monitor than the work of line workers.  The 
theory of efficiency wages advanced by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) argues that poor 
motivation is aggravated as the outside opportunity of employment improves. Hence, 
the growth of the private sector should have induced SOEs to reduce the number of 
engineers and increase their salaries.   
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4. The Testable Hypotheses and Empirical Specifications 
To test the hypotheses that the recruitment of engineers by the Big 3 is a major 
reason for their superior performance and that scale advantages stem from product 
improvement, we consider the determinants of enterprise growth, average labor 
productivity, and unit price, in that order, in this section.  According to Nelson and 
Winter (1982), the growth of an enterprise is a function of its initial size, its age in terms 
of the number of years in operation, and variables that represent the development and 
learning of new technology and management practices.  Following Evans (1987), we 
use the following logarithmic form as a specification of this theory:     
 
lnVit = 0 + 1lnVit-1 + 2lnEit-1 + 3lnRit-1 + 4Mit-1 + 5lnYit + ui + vt + eit,   (1) 
 
where Vit is the value added of enterprise i in year t to represent the size of the enterprise, 
Vit-1 is the initial enterprise size, E is the number of engineers employed, R is the R&D 
expenditure per engineer, M is a dummy variable representing a general manager 
coming from an SOE, Y is the number of years for which the enterprise produced 
motorcycles or engines to represent its age, u consists of unobservable time-invariant 
characteristics, v is a set of year dummies, and e is a disturbance term. 
We expect higher values for E, M and Y to increase development and learning of 
new technology and management practices and R represents investment spending on 
such activities.  Since the employment of engineers and R&D expenditures per 
engineer may have lagged effects on the growth of value added, we also estimate a 
version of equation (1) that includes Eit-2 and lnRit-2.
26 We include time-invariant 
characteristics of enterprises, e.g., the educational and occupational backgrounds of the 
head of enterprise, and specialization in either motorcycle assembly or engine 
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production on the right-hand side of specification (1). An obvious advantage of the 
fixed-effects model over the pooled-regression model, which takes the sum of u and e as 
the disturbance term, is its ability to resolve the endogeneity problem arising from 
correlation between unobservable components of u and the explanatory variables.  
Such correlations are likely to exist because the unobservable entrepreneurial 
characteristics of the founders of the Big 3 enabled them to employ more engineers than 
other private enterprises so that they could take advantage of the resulting scale effects.  
Our regression analysis is intended to examine the effectiveness of these efforts to 
improve product quality.  
Applying the within estimator to a dynamic panel model of the type specified by 
equation (1) in which the lagged dependent variable appears on the right-hand side 
results in biased and inconsistent estimators.  To avoid this problem, we use the 
generalized method of moment estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).  
Fortunately, this estimator also deals with the endogeneity of E, R, and M, which is 
likely because R&D investment, the upgrading of management, and the expansion of 
production are components of the same strategy.  With this estimator, the first three 
years in the period under study are eliminated due to lags and differencing in addition to 
the small size of the complete sample.  Although we apply this estimator to the latter 
half of the period, we also run Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions using the 
pooled data for the entire period. 
Our basic hypothesis is that both the employment of engineers and R&D 
investment have positive effects on growth.  However, SOEs failed to give adequate 
incentives to engineers and supervisors so that this effect is weaker for them.  For 
subsidiaries, the growth effect is also weaker because the results of R&D are shared 
within the enterprise group rather than appropriated by the subsidiary that employs the 
engineers and bears the R&D expenditure.  Hence, we state the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1:  Increases in the employment of engineers and R&D expenditure 
enhance enterprise growth but the effects are weaker for SOEs and subsidiaries.  
 
From Table 1, almost all of the subsidiaries specialized in either motorcycle 
assembly or engine production.  As suggested by the transaction cost model of division 
and specialization of labor between enterprises found in Becker and Murphy (1992), this 
behavior is attributable to the efficiency of specialization and low transaction costs 
between enterprises belonging to the same group.  To capture the growth effect of such 
specialization, we state the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Specialized enterprises grow faster than non-specialized enterprises. 
 
Since few enterprises changed their strategies regarding specialization, the dummy 
variables for engine producer and motorcycle assembler are virtually time-invariant so 
that these variables are eliminated in the fixed-effects model.  Hence, to test hypothesis 
2, we use an OLS regression. 
To confirm the robustness of these two hypotheses, we estimate a specification 
using average labor productivity, denoted , as an alternative measure of enterprise 
performance for the dependent variable.  We use the same set of explanatory variables 
as in specification (1) so that we have: 
 
lnit = 0 + 1lnVit-1 + 2lnEit-1 + 3lnRit-1 + 4Mit-1 + 5lnYit + wi + t + it,  (2) 
 
where w is a fixed effect,  is a time effect, and  is a disturbance term.  First, we 
estimate equation (2) using the within estimator for entire period.  However, lnVit-1 is 
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closely correlated with the lagged dependent variable, i.e., ln lnit-1, so that the within 
estimator may be problematic.  To apply the Arellano-Bond estimator, we rearrange 
equation (2) to obtain: 
  
lnit = 0 + 1lnit-1 + 1lnLit-1 + 2lnEit-1 + 3lnRit-1  
+ 4Mit-1 + 5lnYit + wi + t + it,        (2’) 
 
where L is the number of workers and lnit-1 = lnVit-1 - lnLit-1.  The Arellano-Bond 
estimation of (2’) allows us to obtain an estimate for the size effect, i.e.,  1 , without 
concern for any bias due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. 
Finally, we investigate the determinants of the unit price, denoted UP, for which 
data are available for the two best-selling motorcycles for each enterprise in 2001.  The 
specification is given by:  
 
  lnUPi = 0 + 1 Enterprise typei + 2lnDi + 3lnVi + 4lnVGi + 5lnYi
+ 6lnYGi + 7lnEi + 8lnEGi + 9lnRi + 10lnRGi + i,     (3) 
 
where Enterprise type is a vector of dummy variables consisting of SOEs, JVs, Big 3, 
and subsidiaries, D is the displacement, VG is the value added of the enterprise group to 
which enterprise i belongs, Y is the number of years for which the enterprise has 
produced motorcycles, YG is the number of years for which the enterprise group has 
produced motorcycles, EG is the number of engineers employed by the enterprise group, 
and RG is the R&D expenditure per engineer of the enterprise group.  All explanatory 
variables, except D, Y, and YG, are lagged by one year.  For enterprises that do not 
belong to a group, VG, YG, EG, and RG are equal to V, Y, E, and R, respectively.   
The assumption behind specification (3) is that the unit price of a motorcycle 
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depends on the size of the engine, the quality of the motorcycle, and the reputation of 
the producer.  We assume that the quality of the motorcycle depends on past R&D and 
that reputation depends on how widely the enterprise or enterprise group is known, 
which would depend in turn on past production size and the length of time producing 
motorcycles.  However, the good reputation that JVs enjoy will not be captured by 
these factors because it relates to the fact that they are not copiers.  Thus, we introduce 
enterprise type dummies, of which only the JV dummy and possibly the SOE dummy 
are expected to have significant effects on unit price. By contrast, the reputation effect 
for the Big 3 and their subsidiaries will be captured by production size and the years of 
operation of the entire group.  Based on these considerations, we state the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The unit price of a motorcycle depends on VG, YG, EG, and RG as well 
as on the JV dummy rather than on V, Y, E, and R. 
 
Finally, we emphasize that we do not intend to support the hypothesis that the formation 
of the industrial cluster leads immediately to the development of the motorcycle 
industry in Chongqing.  Rather, we aim to provide evidence that the efforts to improve 
technology and management, to strengthen specialization in the production process, and 
to establish brand names are an integral part of the development of the industrial cluster. 
 
5. The Emprical Results 
Table 6 contains the results estimating equation (1).  In the upper portion of the 
table, we indicate the sample period, the types of enterprises included in the sample, and 
the estimator used.  By Pooled OLS, we mean that the fixed effect, ui, is treated as a 
component of disturbance.  Of the two versions of the Arellano-Bond estimator, i.e., 
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one-step and two-step, we used the one-step estimator because it is recommended for 
inference by Arellano and Bond (1991).  Although the presence of second-order 
autocorrelation in the differenced residuals would imply that the Arellano-Bond 
estimates are inconsistent, we confirm that this is not the case for columns (iv), (v), and 
(vi) of the table 
In the OLS regression in column (i), two interaction terms, i.e., SOE*lnVt-1 and 
SOE*lnEt-1, are included to investigate whether the effects of enterprise size and 
engineer employment are different between SOEs and private enterprises.  The 
estimated coefficient of SOE*lnVt-1 is positive and significant because, among the three 
SOEs in the sample, Jialing and Jianshe performed much better than the smaller SOE 
especially toward the end of the period.  For private enterprises, the growth effect from 
employing engineers is positive and highly significant as the coefficient on lnEt-1 
indicates. However, for SOEs, this estimated effect is small and statistically 
insignificant as indicated by the sum of the coefficients for lnEt-1 and SOE* lnEt-1.  The 
strong positive impact of employing more engineers on the growth of private enterprises 
is also observable in columns (ii), (iii), and (iv) in which SOEs are excluded. Although 
the OLS estimate of the effect of R&D expenditure is not significant, the Arellano-Bond 
estimate in column (iv) is positive and highly significant.  If the SOEs are included in 
the sample, as in column (v), neither the employment of engineers nor R&D expenditure 
has a significant effect on growth.  These results are highly consistent with Hypothesis 
1.  Moreover, the growth effects of engineers and R&D are much stronger when the 
sample of the independent enterprises is used in columns (ii) and (iv) than when 
subsidiaries are included in columns (iii) and (vi).27  These results offer empirical 
support for Hypothesis 1. 
The dummy variables used to identify enterprises that specialize in motorcycle 
assembly and those that specialize in engine production do not have significant effects 
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in columns (i) and (ii), presumably because most of the independent enterprises produce 
both engines and motorcycles especially in the later period.  If the subsidiaries are 
included in the sample in column (iii), these dummy variables have positive and 
significant effects, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2.  In addition, the JV dummy 
variable has a positive and significant effect on growth in column (iii) in which the Big 
3 and SOEs are excluded. Overall, the results shown in Table 6 confirm the 
effectiveness of the strategies undertaken by the Big 3.  Employing more engineers, 
spending more on R&D, and forming enterprise groups that allow the specialization and 
division of labor within the group contribute positively to growth.  This conclusion 
would not be altered if we were to take account of exits.  If data on exits were available 
so that we could incorporate this phenomenon into the analysis, the estimated effects of 
these strategies would be stronger because enterprises that exited did not adopt these 
strategies according to our respondents.28 
Table 7 presents the estimation results using average labor productivity as the 
dependent variable.  In the first two columns, the within estimator is used to estimate 
specification (2).  In the other columns, the Arellano-Bond estimator is applied to 
estimate specification (2’).  The estimated effects of employing more engineers are 
quite similar to those in Table 6. Specifically, its positive impact on growth is much 
stronger if the sample consists of the independent private enterprises, as in columns (i) 
and (iii), than if SOEs are included as in column (iv) or if subsidiaries are included as in 
columns (ii) and (v).  Although the estimated effects of R&D expenditure are 
significant in columns (ii) and (i), they are insignificant for the Arellano-Bond 
estimation in columns (iii), (iv) and (v).  These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1, 
even though we now use average labor productivity rather than growth to measure 
enterprise performance.   
In column (ii) of Table 7, the effect of lnVt-1 on average labor productivity is 
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positive and highly significant even when subsidiaries are included.  These results 
reflect the fact that larger enterprises tend to use more capital-intensive production 
methods.  Although the effect of recruiting the general manager from SOEs on growth 
tends to be insignificant in Table 6, the effect of this strategy on labor productivity is 
positive and significant in columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 7.  This result suggests that 
SOE managers may be talented and capable in promoting efficiency but that their skills 
are constrained by the rigidities of the organization of the SOE. 
Table 8 presents the estimation results for the determinants of the unit price of 
motorcycles.  As the table indicates, unit price tends to increase with increases in 
displacement, lnD, even though this effect is not significant in some specifications.  As 
shown in the second row, specialization in motorcycle assembly does not have any 
significant impact on price.  Since Column (i) does not include production size, years 
of operation, or R&D variables, the coefficients have an interpretation similar to that of 
the observations in Table 3. Specifically, JVs charge the highest price while SOEs along 
with the Big 3 and their subsidiaries charge higher prices than do other independent 
enterprises. However, if lnV and lnY are included, the coefficient on the JV dummy 
becomes smaller and the coefficients on the dummy variables for SOE and Big 3 lose 
their significance, as shown in column (ii).  Thus, the higher prices for products sold 
by SOEs and the Big 3 are explained by the larger sizes and the longer histories of 
motorcycle production of these enterprises.  In contrast, the coefficient for the 
subsidiary dummy variable remains positive and significant, presumably because the 
relatively high prices for their products are supported by the reputation of the groups to 
which they belong.  To investigate this issue further, we replace lnV and lnY with lnVG 
and lnYG in column (iii).  As expected, the effect of the subsidiary dummy is no longer 
significant. 
In columns (iv) and (v) in Table 8, we examine the effects of R&D on unit price 
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with the value added variables, i.e., lnV and lnVG, and the years of motorcycle 
production, i.e., lnY and lnYG, excluded to avoid multicolinearity arising from including 
these variables along with the R&D variables, i.e., lnE, lnEG, lnR, and lnRG.  In 
column (iv), R&D variables for individual enterprises are used and the subsidiary 
dummy variable is significant whereas the SOE dummy and the Big 3 dummy are 
insignificant.  However, in column (v), the subsidiary dummy variable loses its 
significance if the R&D variables for the group are included in the estimation.  These 
empirical results provide strong support for Hypothesis 3.     
 
6. Conclusion 
In the motorcycle industry in Chongqing, considerable entry of new enterprises 
occurred in the 1990s allowing the formation of industrial clusters by relatively early 
entrants.  A drastic decline in product prices resulted and had an important impact on 
the industry’s development.  During this period, the decline of the dominant SOEs 
accelerated and, as in many industries in other countries as well as in the coastal regions 
of China, the improvement of product quality led to the industry shakeout and the birth 
of large private enterprise groups.  To achieve quality upgrading, private enterprises in 
Chongqing obtained technical and managerial expertise by recruiting engineers and 
managers from SOEs.  Thus, the success of this industry is attributable to a 
combination of the positive features of the Wenzhou model, in which industrial 
development is based on the clustering of private enterprises, and the Sunan model, in 
which industrial development is based on the effective use of human resources recruited 
from existing SOEs. However, without the benefits of external economies arising from 
an industrial cluster, these initially tiny private enterprises would have had a difficult 
time competing with the large existing SOEs.  The formation of industrial clusters has 
been prevalent in China since the beginning of privatization in the early 1990s so that 
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we consider it to be an important outcome of the privatization process.  Thus, we think 
that this complementary effect of privatization deserves more attention than it has 
received in the existing literature. 
Such cluster-based industrial development led by private enterprises learning 
from SOEs should be replicable in other parts of the inland region of China.  
Considering the positive externalities arising from industrial clusters, the government 
should support the formation of industrial clusters, particularly in the inland region.  To 
promote wide-ranging industrialization in the inland region, including the development 
of labor intensive, processing-type industries, our empirical analysis demonstrates the 
benefits of inducing engineers and managers from SOEs in a variety of industries in the 
coastal region to join private enterprises in the inland region.  Such a policy could go a 
long way to closing the significant regional income gap in China today. 
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Endnotes  
1. Another important feature of industrial development in this region is that 
transactions of TVEs with SOEs were supported by the township or village 
governments, as Li, (1996), Hsiao et al. (1998), and Chen and Rozelle (1999) 
discuss.  Oi (1999) and Kung (1999) emphasize that local leaders played active 
strategic roles in industrial development in southern Jiangsu. 
2. This definition of industrial clusters is consistent with the definitions adopted in the 
literature of business economics, innovation studies, and development economics.  
For example, Porter (1998, p.18) defines clusters as “geographic concentrations of 
interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field.”  Swann, Prevezer, 
and Stout (1998, p. 1) define a cluster as “a large group of firms in related industries 
at a particular location.”  In a special issue of World Development on clustering and 
industrialization, Schmitz and Nadvi (1999) use both sectoral and spatial 
concentrations of firms to define industrial clusters.  
3. Fake collectives or red-cap enterprises are essentially private firms that disguise 
themselves as TVEs, as Nolan and Dong (1990) and Oi (1999) discuss.  The 
formation of industrial clusters in Wenzhou in the early 1980s was facilitated by the 
establishment of specialized local markets for products and materials by local 
governments. When these clusters made inroads into national and international 
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markets, Whiting (1999) and Xiu and Tan (2001) argue that traders who migrated 
from Wenzhou played important roles in this expansion.  
4. The Third Front consists of Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Ningxia, and the western parts of Henan, Hubei, and Hunan.  The Chinese 
government began Third Front Construction in 1964 to build military industries 
ranging from ammunitions to atomic bombs in addition to the complementary 
industries producing steel, chemicals, and other materials in the Third Front region, 
as Li (2002) and Chen (2002) discuss.  This project was continued until 1979.  In 
1995, SOEs accounted for 81.5 % of the total production value of all industrial 
enterprises having independent accounting systems in these provinces, whereas the 
corresponding national figure was 56.8 % according to State Statistical Bureau 
(1996).  In the same year, the share of the munitions industry in the total 
production value of all industrial enterprises having independent accounting systems 
was 21.8 % in Chongqing according to Chongqing Municipality Statistical Bureau 
(1996); however, the corresponding data at the national level are not available. 
5. In Chongqing, the private sector increased manufacturing employment at 11.5% 
annually from 2000 to 2003, while this employment grew at 9.4% in China 
according to State Statistical Bureau (various years).   
6. The case studies of the color TV and automobile industries by Xie (2001) and by 
Xie and Wu (2003) cover part of the inland region.  Sun (2001), Jin (2004), and 
Hong (2004) argue that industrial development in this region is hindered by the 
limited inflow of foreign direct investment, less favorable access to world trade 
relative to the coastal region, and the sluggish reform of the SOE sector.  
7. Chongqing accounted for 20.8%, 29.3%, and 38.2% of the total production value of 
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the Chinese motorcycle industry in 1997, 2000, and 2003, respectively, according to 
China Automobile Department of Mechanical Industry (various years).     
8. Schmitz and Nadvi (1999) and the papers cited therein provide information about 
the experiences of industrial clusters in South Asia, Latin America, and Africa. 
9. Gort and Klepper (1982) and Klepper (1996) discuss the regularity of the process of 
industrial development in the U.S. and the U.K.  The experiences of industrial 
clusters in Japan, Taiwan, and the coastal region of China are presented in 
Yamamura, Sonobe, and Otsuka (2003, 2004), Sonobe, Kawakami, and Otsuka 
(2003), and Sonobe, Hu, and Otsuka (2002, 2004). 
10. We do not suggest that industrial clusters did not exist before privatization began in 
the early 1990s.  For example, Changchun has been the site of one of the largest 
Chinese car makers for fifty years and nine large SOEs producing machine tools 
were located in Shenyang.  In Wuxi and Suzhou in Jiangsu province, diverse and 
large industrial agglomerations were formed before privatization.   
11. Examples from developing countries include a shoe cluster in Brazil (Schmitz, 
1995), a woolen knitwear cluster in India (Tewari, 1999), and a surgical instrument 
cluster in Pakistan (Nadvi, 1999).   
12. The empirical work on the evolutionary process of industrial development includes 
Klepper and Graddy (1990) and Klepper and Simons (2000).  Jovanovic and 
MacDonald (1994) and Klepper (1996) present theoretical models. 
13. An alternative account of the proliferation of enterprise groups in China is given by 
Smyth and Lu (2000), who argue that this process began in the late 1990s as a 
response by collective TVEs to competition from private enterprises. 
14. Gereffi (1999) is probably the first to discuss the effect of global value chains on 
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industrial upgrading in developing countries.  Giuliani, Pietrobelli, and Rabellotti 
(2005) and the compilation of case studies in Schmitz (2004) also address this issue. 
15. We did not to ask about 1996 so as to reduce the burden on the respondents. 
16. The motorcycle industry in China dates from the 1950s but no major producers were 
located in Chongqing until 1979.  
17. Four former red-cap enterprises or fake collectives are included as private 
enterprises.  Although these enterprises originated before 1995, they produced only 
parts until the late 1990s.  Table 1 includes only enterprises that had begun 
producing either motorcycles or engines by the specified year. 
18. According to a newspaper article in Jingji Ribao (February 3, 2005), Lifan, 
Zongshen, and Loncin ranked among the seven largest producers and the four 
largest exporters in 2004. .  Although Jialing and Jianshe had declined in the late 
1990s, they regained competitiveness and ranked as the second and third largest 
producers and the fifth and tenth largest exporters, respectively, in 2004.   
19. This account of increasing transaction costs was given by some managers of the 
sample enterprises.  They suggested that increasing transaction costs were due to 
quality improvement.  According to Becker and Murphy (1992), the division of 
labor is limited by transaction or coordination costs.  
20. The percentage of engine parts purchased from outside was assessed by the 
accounting section of each enterprise in the sample. 
21. Taylor (1960) shows that (horsepower)/(displacement)2/3 approximates engine 
quality.   
22. The price difference may also be attributable to other possible differences in the 
quality of motorcycles in addition to engine quality. 
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23. The growth of the other independent enterprises and subsidiaries is somewhat 
non-comparable to that of SOEs and the Big 3 because new entrants are smaller than 
incumbents; these de novo firms are included in the former two categories and affect 
their average sizes.  However, the two categories are comparable with each other. 
24. According to our recent interviews with Japanese motorcycle makers, their JVs in 
Chongqing have grown much faster than the other enterprises in Chongqing in 
recent years. They attribute this phenomenon to a higher income level and to a 
strengthening of the regulations regarding exhaust gas and noise by the government. 
25. These hypotheses could be tested by estimating a production function.  Although 
not reported in this paper, we find that estimates using a production function are 
highly consistent with the estimation results presented.  The estimation methods 
and results usinga production function are available upon request from the authors. 
26. Although the growth of value added may be affected not only by R&D investment 
in the recent past but also by the stock of R&D, the data do not allow us to construct 
stocks of R&D for enterprises established before 1995. 
27. Although not reported in the table, we estimated a version of specification (1) in 
which Et-1 and Rt-1 are replaced by Et-2 and Rt-2, respectively. For this specification, 
the sample size is too small to perform an Arellano-Bond test for first-order and 
second-order autocorrelation.  However, the coefficient estimates are similar to the 
results shown in columns (iv) through (vi) of Table 6. Specifically, the effects of Et-2 
and Rt-2 are positive and significant if the SOEs and the subsidiaries are not included 
whereas they are insignificant otherwise. 
28. Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) and subsequent studies of enterprise 
survival and growth discuss the correction of such sample selection bias. 
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Table 1.  Number of sample enterprises by ownership type and specialization 
 
 SOEs JVs Private enterprises 
   Independent enterprises  Subsidiaries 
   
Total 
specializing in  
Total 
specializing in 
   motor 
cycles 
engines  motor 
cycles 
engines 
1995 3 2 10 1 7  0 0 0 
1997 3 2 16 5 4  4 2 2 
1998 3 2 19 4 4  7 4 3 
1999 3 2 22 5 1  12 8 4 
2000 3 2 23 5 0  16 10 4 
2001 3 2 21 2 0  18 11 4 
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Table 2.  Declining average real prices of motorcycles and engines by enterprise type, 
1995 to 2001 in thousands of yuan 
 
 
SOEs  JVs  Big 3  
Other independent 
enterprises 
motor 
cycle 
engine  
motor 
cycle 
engine  
motor 
cycle 
engine  
motor 
cycle 
engine 
1995 11.2 2.1  21.2 4.7  6.9 1.5  4.7 1.4 
1997 7.4 1.8  20.0 4.5  7.3 1.3  4.3 1.2 
1998 6.6 1.6  18.5 4.4  6.3 1.0  4.2 1.2 
1999 5.5 1.5  16.7 4.4  4.9 1.0  3.9 1.1 
2000 5.2 1.5  15.4 2.4  4.7 1.0  3.6 1.0 
2001 4.6 1.3  15.1 2.2  4.5 1.0  3.4 0.9 
Notes 
i. The average real price is the average of the real value of production divided by the number 
of motorcycles or engines sold.   
ii. The deflator applied to nominal production values to obtain real values is the price index for 
machinery compiled by the State Statistical Bureau (various years).   
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Table 3.  Average unit price of motorcycle and engine quality  
by enterprise type in 2001 
 
 SOEs JVs Big 3 and 
their 
subsidiaries 
Other 
indepen- 
dent 
enterprises 
 
 
Difference  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) - (3)  (3) - (4) 
Unit price (yuan) 41.5 82.5 41.9 31.9 
-0.330 
(-0.05) 
 
9.96** 
(5.52) 
Sample size 6 4 30 40    
Engine quality 0.269 n.a. 0.317 0.295 
-0.048* 
(-3.39) 
 
0.023 
(0.12) 
  Sample size 3 0 14 11    
 
Notes 
i. The symbols * and ** indicate that the difference in averages is statistically significant 
at the 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
ii. The unit price is defined as the price of motorcycle divided by engine displacement. 
iii. The engine quality is defined as (horsepower)/(displacement)2/3. 
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Table 4.  Average production sizes in terms of the numbers of motorcycles and engines 
produced and value added by enterprise type in selected years 
 
 SOEs JVs Independent enterprises Subsidiaries 
   Big 3  Others  
Motorcycles (1000 sets)    
1995 900 28 9 3 n.a. 
1998 498 39 109 8.5 55 
2001 433 101 595 30 95 
Engines (1000 sets)     
1995 562 28 55 12 n.a. 
1998 569 41 351 38 309 
2001 481 135 1386 78 656 
Value added (million yuan)    
1995 3410 282 57 8 n.a. 
1998 1234 202 302 16 98 
2001 503 242 894 26 118 
 
Notes 
i. The third column shows the average size of the entire group. 
ii. In the fourth and fifth columns, the number of enterprises changes over time due to new 
entries and mergers. 
iii. The value added is deflated using the machinery price index compiled by the State 
Statistics Bureau (various years).  
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Table 5.  Average number of engineers, R&D expenditures per engineer, and the 
proportion of managers recruited from SOEs by enterprise type in selected years  
 
 SOEs JVs Independent enterprises Subsidiaries 
   Big 3 Others  
Number of engineers     
1995 176 25 14 (12) 2 (2) n.a. 
1998 439 34 84 (65) 8 (7) 14 (11) 
2001 748 45 296 (198) 18 (13) 29 (19) 
R&D expenditure per engineer (1000 yuan)   
1995 142 18 6 4 n.a. 
1998 105 49 28 25 12 
2001 60 162 97 58 40 
% of enterprises with general managers from SOEs   
1995 100 0 0 29 n.a. 
1998 100 0 33 38 43 
2001 100 100 100 67 67 
 
Notes 
i. The numbers in parentheses are the number of engineers recruited from SOEs.  For 
JVs, this number are not available.  
ii. The third column reports the average number of engineers employed by an entire  
group, R&D expenditures of the entire group, and the general managers of the parent 
enterprises.  
iii. In the fourth and fifth columns, the number of enterprises included in other independent 
enterprises and subsidiaries changes over time due to new entry and mergers. 
iv. The real value of R&D expenditure is obtained by deflating using the machinery price 
index (State Statistics Bureau, various years). 
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Table 6.  Estimates of the growth function  
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Period ’97-‘01 ’99-‘01 ‘99-‘01 ‘99-‘01 ‘99-‘01 ’99-‘01 
Inclusion of       
 SOEs yes no no no yes no 
 Big 3 yes yes no yes yes no 
 other independent yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 subsidiaries no no yes no no yes 
Estimator Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Arellano- 
Bond 
Arellano- 
Bond 
Arellano- 
Bond 
lnVt-1 0.800†† 
(0.091) 
0.765†† 
(0.108) 
0.787†† 
(0.054) 
0.152†† 
(0.200) 
0.539†† 
(0.261) 
0.337†† 
(0.143) 
SOE* lnVt-1 0.128* 
(0.064) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
lnEt-1 0.268** 
(0.112) 
0.381** 
(0.135) 
0.226** 
(0.077) 
0.506** 
(0.169) 
0.340 
(0.206) 
0.020 
(0.162) 
SOE* lnEt-1 -0.192* 
(0.104) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
lnRt-1 0.043 
(0.051) 
0.038 
(0.060) 
-0.035 
(0.040) 
0.208* 
(0.093) 
0.029 
(0.156) 
0.167* 
(0.097) 
Mt-1 0.169* 
(0.098) 
0.007 
(0.142) 
0.100 
(0.114) 
0.582* 
(0.300) 
0.411 
(0.259) 
0.068 
(0.261) 
lnYt-1 -0.124 
(0.145) 
-0.384* 
(0.170) 
-0.358** 
(0.122) 
0.486 
(0.447) 
0.375 
(0.433) 
0.271 
(0.418) 
Motorcycle 0.048 
(0.167) 
0.006 
(0.200) 
0.183* 
(0.107) 
   
Engine 0.125 
(0.141) 
 
0.650** 
(0.216) 
   
Years of 
 Schooling 
-0.012 
(0.017) 
-0.021 
(0.021) 
-0.011 
(0.015) 
   
SOEs -1.053 
(0.739) 
     
JVs -0.081 
(0.177) 
0.361 
(0.258) 
0.406* 
(0.222) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of obs. 102 64 90 55 64 70 
R-squared 0.96 0.93 0.89    
p-value (H0:no auto-correlation of order 1) 0.24 0.10 0.03 
p-value (H0:no auto-correlation of order 2) 0.35 0.40 0.70 
Notes.   
i. The dependent variable is lnVt.  Each regression includes a constant term and a set of year 
dummies. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.   
ii. The symbol †† indicates that the coefficient is smaller than 1 at the 1 % significance level.  
iii. The symbols * and ** represent statistical significance at 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 7.  Estimates of the average labor productivity function 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
Period ’97-‘01 ’97-‘01 ‘99-‘01 ‘99-‘01 ’99-‘01 
Inclusion of      
 SOEs no no no yes no 
 Big 3 yes no yes yes no 
 other independe. yes yes yes yes yes 
 subsidiaries no yes no no yes 
Estimator Within Within Arellano- 
Bond 
Arellano- 
Bond 
Arellano- 
Bond 
lnVt-1  
 
0.154 
(0.130) 
0.304** 
(0.098) 
   
lnit-1 
  
0.570* 
(0.278) 
0.747* 
(0.346) 
0.419** 
(0.153) 
lnLt-1  
 
 
0.395 
(0.303) 
0.568 
(0.376) 
0.597* 
(0.346) 
lnEt-1 0.308* 
(0.162) 
0.104 
(0.134) 
0.396* 
(0.215) 
0.253 
(0.247) 
-0.029 
(0.203) 
lnRt-1 0.167* 
(0.099) 
0.192** 
(0.077) 
-0.026 
(0.167) 
-0.138 
(0.209) 
0.124 
(0.100) 
Mt-1 -0.064 
(0.183) 
0.055 
(0.162) 
0.667** 
(0.244) 
0.515* 
(0.230) 
0.215 
(0.221) 
lnYt-1 0.898* 
(0.467) 
0.019 
(0.439) 
0.205 
(0.456) 
0.010 
(0.445) 
-0.717 
(0.499) 
Number of obs. 85 109 53 62 67 
R-squared 0.40 0.39    
p-value (H0:no auto-correlation of order 1) 0.18 0.20 0.19 
p-value (H0:no auto-correlation of order 2) 0.77 0.73 0.29 
 
Notes 
i. The dependent variable is lnt.  Each regression includes a constant term and a set of year 
dummies.  
ii. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.   
iii. The symbols * and ** represent statistical significance at the 5 % and 1 % levels, 
respectively.   
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Table 8.  Estimates of the unit price function  
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
lnD 0.232 
(0.184) 
0.400* 
(0.183) 
0.371* 
(0.179) 
0.364* 
(0.195) 
0.324 
(0.199) 
Motorcycle -0.079 
(0.069) 
-0.085 
(0.066) 
-0.074 
(0.065) 
-0.078 
(0.070) 
-0.089 
(0.071) 
SOEs 0.286** 
(0.102) 
0.030 
(0.131) 
-0.043 
(0.138) 
0.099 
(0.189) 
0.136 
(0.223) 
JVs 0.820** 
(0.152) 
0.530** 
(0.176) 
0.478** 
(0.177) 
0.691* 
(0.163) 
0.724** 
(0.167) 
Big 3 0.337** 
(0.102) 
0.046 
(0.131) 
0.108 
(0.137) 
0.114 
(0.162) 
0.170 
(0.185) 
Subsidiaries 0.277** 
(0.072) 
0.205** 
(0.073) 
0.042 
(0.119) 
0.208** 
(0.078) 
0.130 
(0.167) 
lnV 
 
0.061** 
(0.021) 
   
lnY 
 
0.068 
(0.048) 
   
lnVG 
  
0.023 
(0.026) 
  
lnYG  
 
 
0.179** 
(0.063) 
  
lnE  
 
  
0.061 
(0.044) 
 
lnR  
 
  
0.034* 
(0.019) 
 
lnEG  
 
   
0.048 
(0.054) 
lnRG  
 
   
0.022 
(0.017) 
Intercept 2.352** 
(0.880) 
1.040 
(0.925) 
1.363 
(0.904) 
1.540 
(0.949) 
1.769* 
(0.968) 
R-squared 0.53 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.54 
 
Notes   
i. The dependent variable is lnUPi.  The number of observation is 76.   
ii. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.   
iii. All explanatory variables, except lnD and the dummy variables, are lagged by one year.   
iv. The symbols * and ** represent statistical significance at the 5 % and 1 % levels, 
respectively. 
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FIG. 1. The number of motorcycle enterprises and motorcycles produced in China, 1980 to 2003 
 
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
Year
M
o
to
rc
yl
c
e
s 
(t
h
o
u
sa
n
d)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f 
e
n
te
rp
ri
se
s
Motorcycles Enterprises
